Daniel Saeedi '01
THEORETICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF ENDURING RIVALRIES:
APPLICATIONS TO THE INDIA-PAKISTAN CASE
by
PAUL F. DIEHL
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
And
GARY GOERTZ
University of Arizona
With
DANIEL SAEEDI
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Prepared for presentation at conference “Understanding the India-Pakistan Enduring Rivalry,” McGill University , Montreal , 5-6 December 2003. They acknowledge the support of the Summer Research Opportunities Program (SROP) at the University of Illinois . The authors also thank Kwang Teo for his research assistance.
Introduction
An enduring rivalry is conventionally described as a strategic competition between the same pair of states over an extended period of time. Although there are various conceptual and operational definitions of enduring rivalries, and these may result in different compilations of the phenomena, the India-Pakistan rivalry appears on all lists. From shortly after both states gained their independence in 1947 until the present day, India and Pakistan have clashed repeatedly, with four wars and a larger number of military crises the most notable manifestations of that competition.
To say that India and Pakistan are engaged in an enduring rivalry does not necessarily mean that we understand all aspects of that competition. Nevertheless, there have been several theoretical formulations that seek to explain and predict enduring rivalry behavior. In addition, there is a growing body of research that tests many of the propositions from those models, and we have accumulated some significant knowledge about enduring rivalries. Using these theoretical formulations and empirical evidence, this paper will examine the India-Pakistan rivalry. Specifically, we examine the origins of the India-Pakistan rivalry in light of enduring rivalry research, focusing the conditions that led to its initiation and development. We then examine the dynamics of the rivalry, and its patterns of persistence over the last six decades. Although the India-Pakistan rivalry is ongoing, we also consider theoretical and empirical specifications for rivalry termination, with special attention to the prospects of those conditions arising in the India-Pakistan context. Throughout this analysis, special attention is directed to how the India-Pakistan rivalry compares to other long-standing rivalries.
The India-Pakistan rivalry presents something of a puzzle for international relations theory. Conventional treatments of war, such as the power transition model, regard preponderance as a pacifying condition. Yet, despite consistent Indian military superiority, the India-Pakistan rivalry has experienced multiple wars and numerous other confrontations with little sign of abatement. Some rational choice approaches regard military conflict and war as an information problem; once states recognize their opponent's preferences and likely actions, future conflict becomes costly and unlikely. States that fail to obtain their goals repeatedly, often losing in war, should learn from such failure and thereby be restrained from future challenges under such formulations. Nevertheless, Pakistan has repeatedly and unsuccessfully challenged India over Kashmir , and apparently has not “learned” its lessons as rational choice theorists stipulate it should. Therefore, understanding the India-Pakistan rivalry is not only valuable for its own sake, but it may also provide insight into asymmetrical rivalries that seem to defy extant theoretical frameworks.
We begin with a specification of the most developed theoretical treatment of enduring rivalries, namely the “punctuated equilibrium” model developed by Diehl and Goertz. Yet we also review some of the tenets of alternative specifications, namely what has been referred to as “evolutionary approaches” to rivalries. Along with empirical findings, these models provide the road map for our understanding of the origins, dynamics, and possible termination of the India-Pakistan rivalry.
The conclusions below are largely derived from an analysis of all the militarized confrontations between India and Pakistan from 1947-2001, the latter being the last year for which data are available. Specifically, we analyze “militarized disputes,” as defined by the Correlates of War (COW) Project. These are “a set of interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of military force . . . . these acts must be explicit, overt, nonaccidental, and government sanctioned.” Forty-three confrontations between India and Pakistan over the period of study meet this definition. Our analysis focuses on the characteristics of individuals disputes and their patterns over time in relation to what models of enduring rivalries can tell us about the phenomena.
Theoretical Guides to Enduring Rivalries
Traditional realist conceptions of interstate conflict focus heavily on power considerations. In such formulations, enduring rivalries might be expected to form and sustain themselves as states of relatively equal capability contend for regional or global influence. Competitions between mismatched protagonists may never develop into enduring rivalries as the stronger side can impose its will on its weaker opponent or defeat it militarily if necessary. Accordingly, initial confrontations might result in the stronger side winning the nascent rivalry, and the rivalry thereby terminating. Enduring rivalries will likely occur between states that are unable to dominate or defeat each other, such as major powers in the international system, who have both the intersecting interests and military capabilities to sustain a long-term competition. Realist conceptions of rivalry development, however, provide limited insight into the India-Pakistan rivalry. India has maintained military superiority throughout most, if not all, of the rivalry, and Pakistan 's repeated failure in challenging India has not ameliorating the frequency or intensity of the military confrontations.
Rational choice treatments are equally limited in helping understand enduring rivalries. Such approaches, heavily influenced by realist logic, may even regard enduring rivalries as epiphenomenal. If one conceives of rivalries as repeated games, rivalries can be understood as the repetition of the same conditions producing the same outcomes over time. The future is very much like the past until the cycle is broken. This is largely the argument made by Gartzke and Simon, who claim that the distribution of enduring rivalries across a continuum of dispute frequency is similar to that predicted by a random events model. In effect, they are arguing that repeated militarized disputes, and therefore enduring rivalries, might easily occur by chance. Nevertheless, the research that has directly or indirectly examined their claim without exception (that we are aware of) finds a very strong interconnection between the same rivals over time. All of these studies find very significant correlations between rivalry history and the current dispute. Furthermore, it would be ludicrous to argue that the various confrontations between India and Pakistan are unrelated to each other or that earlier crises did not influence the strategies of the two sides.
Better insights into the India-Pakistan rivalry are available from two theoretical treatments of enduring rivalries: the punctuated equilibrium and evolutionary model approaches. The punctuated equilibrium model of rivalries starts with a longitudinal view of international relations, which does not atomize disputes and wars and rip them from their historical context. Roughly, there are three phases in the maturation of a rivalry. In the onset phase, the rivalry begins following a “political shock,” a dramatic change endogenous to one or both of the rivals (e.g., regime change) or to the international environment as a whole (e.g., aftermath of a world war). The punctuated equilibrium model is not very specific as to the other conditions that prompt the initiation of rivalries, although it suggests that structural factors (e.g., power distributions, issues in dispute) may be important factors. During this initial phase, the rivals either resolve the disputes relatively quickly or patterns of hostility “lock-in,” with the consequence that the rivalry becomes enduring.
Evolutionary conceptions of enduring rivalries argue that the outcomes of the first confrontations are critical for the maturation of a enduring rivalry. The severity levels and who wins (and the effect on satisfaction) determine whether a rivalry dies out or festers. For example, a confrontation that ends in a stalemate is likely to increase distrust and hostility between two adversaries without resolving any of the disputed issues to either side's satisfaction. In contrast, a dispute that ends in a negotiated compromise -- ceteris paribus -- is more likely to help resolve the issues between the adversaries, or at least to help create a more trusting environment because of the experience of negotiating a satisfactory resolution to the dispute. Similarly, a dispute that ends in a decisive victory for one side (whether through a battlefield victory or by compelling the opponent to back down) is likely to reduce conflict levels in its immediate aftermath, if only because the defeated side requires time to recover or to prepare for another challenge at a more propitious moment. Beyond the outcome of the previous confrontation, the evolutionary approach suggests that the severity level is likely to be quite important. All else remaining equal, more severe confrontations appear likely to intensify the distrust and hostility between two adversaries relative to more trivial confrontations that end quickly and with little bloodshed or destruction, thus increasing subsequent conflict levels.
Following the “lock-in” phase is one of “stasis,” in which hostile interactions persist between the rivals with some regularity or consistency. It is not until another political shock (although only a necessary condition) arises that enduring rivalries end, and they do so abruptly. The punctuated equilibrium model of rivalry depends centrally on the concept of a “basic rivalry level” or BRL . Azar proposed that each pair of countries has a “normal relations range,” or an average level of hostile or cooperative interaction, around which their relations vary; Goertz and Diehl reformulate this as a “basic rivalry level” ( BRL ) around which relations fluctuate. The punctuated equilibrium model anticipates that conflict patterns within rivalries will “lock in” around this BRL at the outset of the rivalry relationship, and will remain similar throughout the rivalry. Periods of conflict and détente are seen as random variations around this basic level, with no secular trend towards more conflictual or more peaceful relations. This is not to suggest, though, that all conflict within a rivalry is exactly the same over time. This model expects some variation in severity and duration across different disputes, occasionally including large deviations (full-scale interstate wars) from the basic rivalry level. BRLs also vary across rivalries; that is not all enduring rivalries have that same level and enduring rivalries do not necessarily have more severe BRLs than lesser rivalries.
Hensel argues that after two adversaries have engaged in several confrontations the push of the past (the lengthening history of past conflict) and the pull of the future (the expectation of continued future conflict) begin to have an important impact on conflict behavior. The advanced phase of rivalry is characterized by substantial threat perception and competition between the rivals. This conception is largely consistent with that of McGinnis and Williams, who argue that belief systems and bureaucratic policies harden over time in a rivalry, making rivalry behavior (such as arms races) hard to dislodge. Similarly, Leng indicates that the belief systems of leaders are critical in crisis behavior, and these systems are largely defined by prior disputes and crises. Over time, the external rivalry becomes entrenched in the domestic politics of the two rival states.
We use the punctuated equilibrium model and various insights from the evolutionary model as a framework to analyze patterns evident in the India-Pakistan rivalry.
Origins of Enduring Rivalries
The origins of enduring rivalries are perhaps the least developed area of research given that scholars have concentrated on the more policy applicable concerns of rivalry dynamics and termination. Nevertheless, there are a number of clues to how violent conflict in rivalries begins and what leads to the development of enduring competitions from that early conflict.
The punctuated equilibrium model of rivalries posits that political shocks are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the onset of enduring rivalries. That is, they set the environmental context for the rivalries to develop, but they by no means guarantee that such rivalries will occur. Political shocks may come in a variety of forms and at different levels of analysis. System level shocks include world wars, rapid and dramatic changes in the power distribution, and significant transfers of territory between states. Such changes reorder international relations and create opportunities for new coalitions to form. Old enemies may become friends, but equally important for our purposes new sources of contention may arise between states that were formally allies or at least were not rivals with one another. The emergence of the US-USSR rivalry at the end of World War II is a classic example.
Shocks may also occur at the domestic level, affecting one or both of the potential rivals. Most notable is a newly independent state, which has been found to be especially vulnerable to armed confrontations in its first years as member of the international community. This may be the result of the unsettled borders, something especially characteristic of new states. Yet new states may also have dramatic effects on regional security, disrupting power balances or causing shifts in alignments between friends and foes. Other domestic level shocks affecting rivalry initiation include the presence of a civil war in one state; this could open opportunities for another state to exploit its rival's preoccupation with and commitment of resources to the civil war. A regime change in one or both of the rivals may also be a shock that is a precursor to the onset of militarized competition. Regime changes may signal significant changes in preferences of the state affected, and this may lead to sudden clash of interests with another state, even one that was formerly a friend.
In the case of India-Pakistan, their joint independence is obviously the event that sets the stage for their initial confrontation. Yet, a rivalry was by no means inevitable. States centered on different religions did not help matters, but differing religions was not necessarily the causal factor in the conflict. Ganguly notes that it was the differing ideologies of the two leaderships, exacerbated by the legacy of the British colonial disengagement, that set the conflict in motion, and continues to influence the relationship to this day.
That the first militarized confrontation was a war was important in establishing high hostility levels, but not a necessary condition for the development of an enduring rivalry. Many enduring rivalries began without wars early in their existence; indeed, some enduring rivalries never experience a war (e.g., US-USSR after 1945). Still other proto rivalries (e.g., US-Spain in the late 19 th century) experience a war very early on, but the fighting resolved the disputed issues between the participants and an enduring rivalry never developed. Indeed, our research suggests that wars occur at various times throughout enduring rivalries, without a pattern that can be generalized across rivalries.
The independence of Pakistan and India was a political shock to the region that set the stage for the rivalry, but it was the presence of unresolved territorial issues as a consequence of independence that encouraged its development. Stinnett and Diehl demonstrate that when the first confrontation between states is over a territorial issue, the likelihood of that pair of states becoming involved in an enduring rivalry is increased. The first militarized dispute between India and Pakistan is the 1947 Kashmir War, which was clearly over territorial control. Indeed, Ganguly refers to Pakistani irredentism (and Indian anti-irredentism) as a precipitating factor in this war.
Not every enduring rivalry involves primarily or exclusively territorial issues. Nevertheless, Tir and Diehl report that 81% of enduring rivalries were partly or predominantly fought over territorial issues. Not surprisingly, India and Pakistan have clashed 43 times since 1947, with 37 or approximately 86% involving territory, most commonly Kashmir . What is it about territorial disputes that seem to lend themselves to protracted competitions between states? Scholars have found that territorial disputes are the most salient to decision makers, and the ones most likely to escalate to war. Specifically, standing firm in territorial disputes is often essential for political leaders to maintain or enhance support from domestic political audiences. Even when inclined to do otherwise, leaders may have their hands tied by the public, who are loath to make concessions to an enemy. Accordingly, disputes over territorial control tend to repeat. Indian and Pakistani leaders would be committing political (and perhaps more) suicide if they abandoned their claims to Kashmir .
Beyond domestic political aspects, territory is often valued as much or more for its symbolic or intangible value as it is for its economic or strategic importance. That is, states and their peoples attach historical, religious, or related significance to a piece of territory, independent of its material value (which may in fact be limited). Jerusalem is an obvious example. Intangibly or symbolically valued territory inhibits the construction of solutions or compromises acceptable to both parties. Economically valued territory can be divided between states, or access can be guaranteed to both parties. The same can be done for some strategic territory, or at least other security guarantees can be substituted for territorial control. Yet intangibly valued territory is not divisible in the eyes of disputants, who view territorial control as a zero sum game. Division of territory as a solution to competing claims failed in Palestine (both as a whole and with respect to Jerusalem ). The absence of a solution that falls within the “win set” of both parties is a recipe for long term, militarized competition.
Competing claims over Kashmir illustrate the significance of territory in the origins of enduring rivalries. Kashmir clearly has value to Pakistan for religious reasons, given the majority Muslim population in that territory and the origins of the Pakistani state as a Muslim entity. For India , Kashmir represents a beachhead against autonomy or independence claims from groups in other parts of India . Territorial concessions in India may be viewed as a sign of weakness, and precipitate further problems for the Indian state. In addition, Kashmir possesses significant water resources, vital to agriculture, especially for Pakistan . Hagerty refers to Kashmir as a “zero-sum test for each state's legitimizing ideology.” Dividing Kashmir , as was done at the time of independence for Pakistan and India , has proven no more successful in heading off conflict than has partition in other parts of the world.
Rivalry Development, Maintenance, and Dynamics
Although rivalries share many common origins, the overwhelming majority of them die out quickly. That is, the first one or two militarized confrontations between two states take place in a confined time period (less than ten years) and are not followed by another crisis or dispute for many years, if ever. Indeed, our research suggests that of states that have an initial dispute, approximately 76% end their “rivalry” quickly, about 19% develop in proto-rivalries (something akin to adolescence in a life cycle), and only 5.4% ever become enduring rivalries. The India-Pakistan rivalry belongs among those in the tiny, last category.
Enduring Rivalry Development and Maintenance
What distinguishes nascent rivalries that develop into enduring ones from those that die out quickly? Several scholars note that enduring rivalries are more typical of pairs of states that are roughly equal in power or capability. Such parity is said to be a prerequisite for competition between the states; significantly weaker states are thought not to be able to challenge stronger ones. Asymmetry may also lead to the stronger side deterring a weaker opponent or prevailing in a decisive way in early confrontations such that future challenges are precluded. Indeed, realist approaches suggest that asymmetric competitions will be short-lived, and therefore unlikely to develop into enduring rivalries. Nevertheless, Diehl and Goertz identify a number of cases of enduring rivalries (e.g., US-Cuba after 1959) in which there are great disparities in power between the rivals, but the competition persists for decades nonetheless. From the punctuated equilibrium model and other perspectives, what matters more is the source of the disputes, the orientations of the rivals toward the status quo, and whether the initial disputes resolve the conflict or not.
Preponderance by one rival may make a rivalry more likely to end quickly if the stronger side can impose its will, but this is by no means assured. There is no guarantee that military or other capability superiority can lead to an alteration of the status quo favorable to the stronger side. The aforementioned US-Cuba rivalry is illustrative of this. Furthermore, it may be the stronger side is the status quo power, and military challenges come from the weaker rival. We know that weaker states may initiate war, and by implication lower order military conflict as well. Thus, the driving force behind the rivalry may be the repeated challenges of the weaker side, and mere capability superiority may not deter such challenges. The other dimension of rivalry maintenance is that the disputed issues in the rivalry are not resolved, best indicated by repeated stalemate or indecisive outcomes to the militarized confrontations. Thus, the status quo, which is unacceptable to one or both of the participants, remains, and this generates future attempts to change it. In the absence of changed preferences or the ability of one side in the conflict to disable the challenger, the rivalry may persist for many years, until the conditions for termination occur (more on this below).
(Figure 1 about here)
The pattern of interactions in the India-Pakistan rivalry is consistent with the above formulation. First, it is clear that India is clearly preponderant in conventional capabilities over Pakistan over the full life of their rivalry. Figure 1 charts the relative capabilities of the two sides since 1947. Whether looking at military capabilities only or a broader, multidimensional measure of power, India has enjoyed at least a 2.5:1 military advantage and a 4:1 overall capability advantage; such advantages have been relatively consistent over time. Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence that Pakistan overestimated its capabilities, leading to a false optimism about its ability to challenge India successfully.
One might argue that something approaching parity has been achieved following nuclear weapons acquisition by both states. Yet nuclear parity (even if it exists) belies the significant conventional military inferiority of Pakistan. Furthermore, nuclear capability, even when an advantage exists, is more useful for deterrence rather than compellence. Accordingly, nuclear capability might be most useful to the status quo power rather than to a revisionist state. In the India-Pakistan rivalry, Pakistan is the clear revisionist state and this is reflected in the pattern of militarized dispute initiation over the history of the rivalry.
India's preferences are such that if Kashmir were to remain in its hands and be peaceful, it would be satisfied. In contrast, Pakistan is the revisionist state, seeking to acquire the territory for its own. Thus, to achieve its goal, Pakistan must compel India to change its policy on negotiations over Kashmir and ultimately allow a change in sovereignty for that area. Not surprisingly, it has been Pakistan that is the initiator (the state that threatened, displayed, or used military force first) of the clear majority of disputes in the rivalry. Over 65% (28/43) of the disputes have been initiated by Pakistan. All twelve cases of Indian initiation, however, have Pakistan as the revisionist power in the dispute; typically, India might threaten military force, accusing the Pakistanis of covertly supporting rebels in Kashmir. Thus, this is a rivalry in which the weaker side is repeatedly challenging the stronger side, with some exceptions.
(Table 1 about here)
For a rivalry to maintain itself under these conditions, the weaker side must leave the confrontations unsuccessful and unsatisfied, but still capable of mounting future challenges. Overwhelming defeats are rare and often confined to world wars. In the case of India-Pakistan, most of the disputes end in stalemate or indeterminate outcomes. Table 1 provides an overview of the outcomes of the forty-three disputes between these two rivals. As predicted by the punctuated equilibrium model, most of the military confrontations have ended in stalemates; 35 or 81.4% of the disputes ended with such indecisive results. Even though it enjoys conventional superiority, India has scored a clear victory only three times (the first confrontations over Kashmir in the late 1940s and the 1971 war), although one could argue that stalemates that preserve the status quo also serve Indian interests to a large degree. In forty-three confrontations, Pakistan is never successful in achieving its goals. Compromise outcomes are also relatively rare -- only four instances, which suggests that negotiated settlements to crises are not the norm in this rivalry.
Rivalry Stability
Once a rivalry is established or “locked-in,” it exhibits an extended period of stability until termination. Rivalry scholars may disagree about the timing of the lock-in, but there is consensus about the element of stability. The punctuated equilibrium model posits that hostile policies by rival governments become established and are hard to dislodge. Furthermore, many responses to the threats posed by a rival involve fundamental alterations in security strategy and actions of a long-term character. For example, alliance formation and strategic planning are not transitory. In addition, weapons acquisition and deployment are multiyear processes, and their effects may linger many years after, sometimes even after a rivalry ends. Note that US and Soviet defense planning and nuclear targeting remained unchanged for many years following the end of the cold war. McGinnis and Williams also argue that domestic political attitudes harden over time in a rivalry, such that they become a brake on leaders' efforts to ameliorate rivalry hostilities.
The net effect of rivalry stability is that there should be consistent patterns of rivalry interaction over the course of the rivalry. Diehl and Goertz noted that this does not resemble a “volcano” pattern of rising hostility ending in war. Rather, over two-thirds of enduring rivalries exhibit a “flat” pattern of rivalry interaction. This signifies that repeated confrontations between rivals are similar to one another in terms of their severity, length, and other characteristics. Wars represent deviations to this pattern, but they are very much anomalies and may occur various junctures over the life of the rivalry.
(Figure 2 about here)
Not surprisingly, the India-Pakistan rivalry exhibits significant stability over time, albeit at a higher level of hostility and with greater frequency of war than other enduring rivalries. Figure 2 plots the severity scores of the 43 disputes in the rivalry over time. The apparent pattern is one of a series of relatively high hostility confrontations, often followed by a single lower-level dispute. Although this is not a perfectly “flat” distribution, it does reveal a consistent guide for tracking hostile interactions in the rivalry.
Every enduring rivalry is posited to have its unique “basic rivalry level” ( BRL ), or baseline around which rivalry interactions fluctuate. Some BRLs are relatively low, such as the one between the Soviet Union and Norway during the cold war; typically violations of territorial waters by submarines with no active military hostilities characterized this rivalry. In contrast, Israel and Jordan's confrontations have involved war or near situations on a regular basis. India and Pakistan's BRL (the mean severity is 97.3, the median is 137.2) is closer to the latter example than the former. The average severity level for an enduring rivalry is approximately 80, with only a handful above 100. Notably, the presence of nuclear capabilities makes little difference in the severity of confrontations, with the average severity is quite high (mean = 111.2 and median = 155.1) after 1990 and approximately the same number of months in disputes as the previous period. One notable difference may be the character of the Kargil war. This conflict was fought more as an indirect battle between Indian, unofficial Pakistani, and local Kashmiri forces. Both sides took pains to avoid a public declaration of war or even admit that their forces were directly engaged with one another.
Another indicator of rivalry stability is the average duration of militarized confrontations. Once again, with the exception of one dispute (the long-standing dispute that eventually becomes the Kargil war), there is not much variation; the duration is very similar from dispute to dispute. The average dispute lasts slightly less than six months. This tends to be longer than the standard rivalry dispute, many of which last only a single day and may only be composed of a single incident. India-Pakistan confrontations tend to be more drawn out affairs and involving more give and take than other disputes between rivals; for example, some rivalries (e.g., China-Vietnam) revolve around competing claims to the Spratley Islands and the typical dispute involves a fishing boat seizure with the “crisis” usually resolved within a few days.
Although the India-Pakistan rivalry shows similar patterns of stability to other enduring rivalries, it is considerably more conflict and war prone. Its 43 disputes are greater than almost all enduring rivalries, except the US-USSR and USSR-China rivalries, the latter of which extended over a much longer historical period. Not only have India-Pakistan disputes between relatively severe, their frequency rate of roughly four disputes every five years also puts them on the high end of the scale. India and Pakistan have also fought four wars: First Kashmir (1947), Second Kashmir (1965), Bangladesh (1971), and Kargil (1999). This is greater than almost all other enduring rivalries; only the Israel-Egypt and China-Japan rivalries have had more.
Beyond wars, India and Pakistan have also engaged in significant arms acquisition competitions, most notably after wars. This is typical of many enduring rivalries, as military buildups become the vehicle for states to strengthen themselves in the hope of changing the pattern of unsuccessful outcomes in military confrontations. Looking at military spending patterns, both sides increase their military expenditures substantially just after the 1947 war. More notable, however, is the arms race that occurs after the 1971 Bangladesh War. In the period, 1974-1982, Pakistan averages more than a 19% yearly increase in military spending. Ganguly argues that the crushing military defeat in the 1971 war ended the myth of the Pakistani military superiority pervasive in the decision-making circles of that country. It is perhaps not surprising that a result of this defeat was an attempt to buildup military forces to challenge India sometime in the future. The origins of the Pakistani nuclear program can also be traced to this time period and as a consequence of the 1971 war. Pakistan desperately sought parity with India, “an echo of the pre-independence era when the Muslim League claimed equality with Congress.” India did not stand idly by during the Pakistani buildup as it had double-digit (over 10%) yearly increases in its military spending as well during this period. Although this arms race period was less dispute prone that earlier or later periods, it was clear that this was merely an interlude in the rivalry as Pakistan sought to better position itself for future challenges.
Influences on Rivalry Dynamics
Among the other factors thought to influence the dynamics of enduring rivalries are their linkages to other competitions. There are a variety of ways that enduring rivalries can be linked: common foes, alliances, geography, and participation on opposite sides in multilateral disputes. Generally, rivalries that had linkages to other competitions experienced higher levels of hostility, more volatility, and a greater chance of war. Indeed, contagion is one of the two paths to war for rivalries cited by Vasquez. There are twenty-seven of these different linkages between twenty-two different enduring rivalries and the India-Pakistan one. Indeed, Ganguly and Bajpai note that South Asia and surrounding areas are characterized by mutually entangling rivalries.
Consistently, the most dangerous kind of rivalry linkage has been when two or more rivalries coalesce in one or more militarized confrontations. Most notable about the India-Pakistan rivalry, however, is the exclusively dyadic military confrontations between the two states. This makes the number of militarized disputes, 43, even more significant. India and Pakistan are not involved in proxy conflicts with one another and do not oppose each other in conflicts primarily involving opposing allies of the two states. Thus, whatever hostility is manifest in the rivalry is concentrated on the other rival and not secondarily to other states. The bilateral character of the rivalry is also suggestive that resolving the conflict will need to be a more direct process. In contrast, resolving Israel's rivalry with Syria clearly involves some bilateral issues (e.g., Golan Heights), but probably cannot be divorced from an Israeli-Palestinian or an Israeli-Lebanese resolution. Therefore, the most dangerous form of rivalry linkage is not responsible for exacerbating the India-Pakistan rivalry.
Other forms of rivalry linkage are less associated with the dynamics of a given rivalry. India and Pakistan share borders with China, which has historically been involved in a number of enduring rivalries. Yet, these rivalries have not diffused to affect India and Pakistan. Similarly, most of the rivalries linked by alliances to India-Pakistan are irrelevant to the latter's dynamics. The exceptions, however, are critical in some cases. Pakistan's ties to China are an important factor in exacerbating tensions with India. This is true, because China has also been engaged in an enduring rivalry with India (linkage by common foe). China has provided military and other support to Pakistan, largely to offset the growth of Indian power on the subcontinent . Similarly, India and Pakistan has been on the opposite sides of the cold war rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Each superpower provided arms, intelligence, and political support to their client states . Despite this, however, we note that the India-Pakistan rivalry was more than a simple proxy conflict between the superpowers. Indeed, the end of the cold war precipitated no significant change in the dynamics of the rivalry, at least from our examination of conflict behavior.
Just as rivalry linkages can exacerbate rivalry conflict, conflict management attempts have the potential to mitigate, and perhaps even resolve, enduring rivalries. Yet our research suggests that most conflict management attempts in enduring rivalries are ineffective in altering the basic rival level, much less producing rivalry termination. This does not suggest, however, third parties avoid enduring rivalries. Rather, not surprising given their dangers, enduring rivalries are more likely than other conflicts to attract the diplomatic attentions of other states and international organizations, even as those mediation efforts most frequently fail.
The India-Pakistan rivalry has attracted significant international attention over the last fifty years. Various third party mediation attempts have sometimes produced short term successes in the form of cease-fires, but as yet have not produced a negotiated agreement to end hostilities, much less a successful implementation of such an agreement. The United Nations has been involved in diplomatic efforts since the beginning of the rivalry. The UN established a five member United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) in 1948, and shortly thereafter deployed a peace observer force (UNMOGIP or United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan), which is technically still in existence today, although largely ineffective. Many United Nations efforts were predicated on holding a plebiscite in Kashmir to resolve the conflict, but this has never occurred. The UN has appointed a number of special representatives or mediators over the years. Similarly, the UN Security Council (and periodically the UN General Assembly and European Union) has passed resolutions calling for cease-fires and negotiations between India and Pakistan. At best, all these efforts have produced some short-term abatement in the conflict, but no long-term impact on the rivalry.
Conflict management efforts have not been confined to international organizations. Various states, such as the United States, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia, Egypt, and the Soviet Union to name a few, have intervened in the rivalry diplomatically. Such efforts have been primarily appeals for negotiation or offers of mediation. Not coincidentally, such initiatives have been concentrated around the times of major wars and crises. Some of these efforts produced limited, short-term successes. For example, USSR Prime Minister Kosygin mediated negotiations in 1965-1966 that produced the Tashkent Declaration in which India and Pakistan agreed to withdraw troops from the border region. Yet the conditions for short-term mediation success in enduring rivalries are quite different than for long-term success. Thus, none of the conflict management efforts yet have produced an agreement that resolved all or part of the disputed issues between India and Pakistan.
Rivalry Termination
Although the India-Pakistan rivalry is ongoing and shows no signs of abating, it is instructive to consider the conditions for rivalry termination, if only to assess the likelihood they might arise in the India-Pakistan context. We are first drawn to the “democratic peace,” or the proposition that two democratic states will not fight each other in a war. There is now broad consensus on this phenomenon. The democratic peace effect is confined to two states that each have stable democracies: that is, states must have consolidated democratic institutions and norms, and thereby been democracies for a period of years. Nevertheless, the transition to the point at which both states are stable democracies may be especially dangerous. Snyder reports that during the democratizing period, the state involved is actually more prone to militarized conflict.
For our purposes, the question arises as to how the democratic peace applies to enduring rivalries. Most notably, the presence of a pair (dyad) of democratic states serves as a pacifying influence in rivalry development. Hensel, Goertz, and Diehl report only 66 (out of 1166, or less than 6%) rivalry relationships begin when both states are democratic, much less than might be predicted by chance. Additionally, almost all those rivalries remained confined to low levels of conflict, with only eleven becoming proto or adolescent rivalries, and only two developing into full-fledged enduring rivalries. Thus, the democratic peace has a significant impact on rivalries, not merely on the outbreak of war. Initial conflicts between democracies are less likely to occur, and even when they do, they rarely mature into more advanced rivalries.
India and Pakistan begin their rivalry without the requisite democratic dyad, but do have had some periods of joint democracy since 1947. Most instructive then is an analysis of what changes, if any, occur in a rivalry when both rivals become democratic. Hensel, Goertz, and Diehl examined twenty-three rivalries that change regime type during the duration of the rivalry, meaning that they experienced both joint democratic and non-democratic periods. Consistent with Maoz's findings, they report that militarized conflict in “regime change” rivalries is less likely in periods when both rivals are democratic than in periods in which at least one rival is non-democratic. Note that disputes are not completely avoided, suggesting that the dynamics of the rivalry are strong enough to resist, at least in part, the pacifying effects of democracy. There are some important qualifications to this finding. Despite the decrease in conflict frequency under democracy, the transition year (the year in which rivalry first qualifies as joint democratic dyad) is an especially dangerous time. The likelihood of a dispute is greater in that year than in any other part of the rivalry; this is consistent with Snyder's warning about the dangers of democratization. Nevertheless, there is a substantial drop off in conflict propensity after the transition year, with the mean number of disputes per year quickly declining by almost half within five years and then approaching zero. This suggests that joint democracy may be associated with rivalry termination after a period of time.
In the period 1947-2001, India and Pakistan oscillate back and forth between joint democracy and non-democracy. Except perhaps during the period of emergency rule in India (under Indhira Gandhi), India is a stable democracy throughout the period. In contrast, Pakistan has an elected, democratic government less than a third of the time. Still, given the influence of the military in the Pakistani government and several military coups, at no time does it probably qualify as a stable democracy, in which democratic institutions and norms are well ingrained in society. For example, Hagerty notes that even though Pakistan was a democracy at the time of a serious crisis with India in 1990, “the country's most sensitive national security decisions were not made by Prime Minister Bhutto, but by the army and by a civilian president with close ties to the army.” According to democratic peace theorists then, the full effect of democracy was unlikely to be felt in this rivalry.
Consistent with the broad results above, however, the India-Pakistan rivalry was less dispute-prone under joint democracy than under other periods. The probability of a new dispute arising in any given year during the joint democracy period was approximately 40% (7 disputes in 17 years) as opposed to almost 100% (36 disputes in 38 years) when there was no joint democracy. This should not imply that the democratically elected leaders of Pakistan (e.g. Bhutto, Sharief) were less supportive of claims toward Kashmir than their military counterparts. Rather, they resorted to military force less frequently to pursue those claims, and may have concentrated more on domestic concerns (as they were more accountable to domestic audiences) than the military leaders.
There is mixed evidence for the dangers of democratic transition in this rivalry. The years 1957-1958, the first time joint democracy occurs, experience three new disputes between India and Pakistan. This democracy period is short-lived and therefore no long-term impact on the rivalry can be seen. In contrast, however, the next period of democratization, beginning in 1974 is dispute free. Yet, that period of no militarized confrontations begins before democracy is established in Pakistan and continues a few years after military rule is restored. One might give greater weight to the impact of the Bangladesh War than democracy in explaining the absence of Pakistani challenges to India during this period. The terrible territorial, military, and political losses suffered by Pakistan may have inhibited it from launching any more challenges to India, at least until it recovered from the war. Finally, the next restoration of joint democracy in the late 1980s finds several disputes occurring in the early transition period, but gradually tapering off. Although there is almost a decade of joint democracy in this rivalry during the 1990s, the rivalry does not end.
The major puzzle for democratic peace theorists is the Kargil War. That conflict has its origins in a militarized dispute beginning in 1993. Although there were a number of incidents between India and Pakistan over the next several years, the conflict doesn't escalate until March 1999 when Afghan mercenaries and Pakistani troops occupied peaks in Kargil. After a few months of fighting, the war ended with the withdrawal of Pakistani forces. During this whole period, both states were democratic. The military coup that ousted President Sharief does not come until the following October. Is this the first war between democratic states in the modern era? On first glance, it would appear that the India-Pakistan rivalry breaks the democratic peace mold. Yet there are several significant caveats to this conclusion. First, Pakistan was clearly not a stable democracy, a prerequisite according to democratic peace theorists for the pacifying effect to be manifest. That the military overthrew the democratic government shortly thereafter, and did so with substantial public support, is evidence itself that Pakistan was not a stable democracy with democratic norms and institutions deeply embedded in society. Second, the existence of a war during the democratic transition is validation of those who point out the dangers of the democratization period, an important qualification to the democratic peace. Finally, one might argue that Pakistan did not overtly launch a war against India. The Pakistani troops participating in the conflict were not in uniform, did not carry army badges, and had no identity cards. Indeed, the Pakistani action might better be considered a covert action, something that theorists have also discovered that is not subject to the democratic peace effect.
At best, joint democracy has had a modest, mitigating effect on the India-Pakistan rivalry. Past patterns of democratic transition in the rivalry suggest that the establishment of joint democracy in this rivalry could not end it. Taking the most optimistic perspective, even if Pakistan restored democracy immediately (an unlikely prospect), it may be years before Pakistan is a stable democracy, and therefore any pacifying effects may be apparent only in the distant future.
A second factor in rivalry termination is the appearance of other security threats for the rivals. Specifically, Bennett argues that common external threats makes rivals less likely to continue their competition. One might assume that common external enemies engender greater feelings of amity (“the enemy of my enemy is my friend”). The rapprochement between the United States and China in the 1970s and 1980s was, in part, related to concerns with their common rival, the Soviet Union. Other rivalries also reduce the resources and attention that can be directed to extant rivalries; states must make choices on which enemies to focus on and this may mean ending one rivalry in order to pursue others.
Over the course of their rivalry, India and Pakistan also engaged in rivalries with other states. Most notably, India clashed with China over the northern border between the states. Pakistan has had an ongoing disagreement with Afghanistan over the Pashtun region that straddles the border. Neither of these other rivalries has been so significant to distract India or Pakistan from their primary rivalry with each other. Indeed, as noted above, the India-China rivalry may have strengthened the India-Pakistan competition because of China's support of Pakistan. It is difficult to imagine at this point from where a common security threat to both India and Pakistan might arise. None of the neighboring countries, save perhaps China, is powerful enough to present a challenge to both countries and to require some kind of cooperative response to meet such a threat. Chinese and Indian relations have improved somewhat in recent years and few credible scenarios exist such that China would become an enemy of both rivals (or even that such an occurrence would be sufficient for India and Pakistan to end their rivalry). Our judgment is that the India-Pakistan rivalry is unlikely to end because of new common security threats.
As with the origins of rivalries, Diehl and Goertz argue that political shocks are associated with rivalry termination. Yet, such shocks are only necessary conditions for termination, indicating that other pacifying conditions must be present for long standing military competitions to end. We don't focus on shocks such as world wars or massive territorial changes, largely because neither is likely in the foreseeable future. Instead, we consider other political shocks that are potentially relevant to the India-Pakistan rivalry.
Major alterations in the international system may reconfigure alliance patterns, offer new opportunities for cooperation, or just make rivalry competition more costly than in earlier periods. As evident from the end of the cold war, such systemic changes are hard to foresee. We should also note, however, that the end of the cold war did not lead to the end of the India-Pakistan rivalry, even as it contributed to the termination of some superpower proxy conflicts in Africa. This reminds us of the stability of rivalries, and of the India-Pakistan rivalry in particular. Even systemic shocks, at best necessary conditions, may have little effect on a well-established, regional rivalry.
Perhaps more significant are endogenous shocks, those occurring within each of the states. We have already discussed the impact that a democratic transition in Pakistan might have on the rivalry. We turn now to other internal changes. Diehl and Goertz hypothesized that a civil war in one or both of the rivals might led to the end of a rivalry, as the state affected might direct its attention and resources inward to deal with that threat. Yet they did not find much impact empirically. This may be because a rival may actually exploit internal unrest in its neighbor, either supplying arms to the rebel forces or taking advantage of the rival's distraction to press claims on the issues underlying the rivalry. Although internal unrest exists in several parts of India (outside of Kashmir), none of it is serious enough to threaten the Indian regime or end the rivalry. Indeed, Pakistan's sponsorship of internal conflict in Kashmir has intensified the rivalry and precipitated several crises just short of war. Pakistan would seem to be better bet for internal unrest, especially as the Musharraf regime faces challenges near the Afghan-Pakistani border from fundamentalist groups. Perhaps a civil war in Pakistan would lead to a temporary respite in the India-Pakistan rivalry as the military and various groups compete for power. Yet such an abeyance would probably not be synonymous with rivalry termination. Whichever faction gained control of the Pakistani government would likely renew claims to Kashmir, and domestic opinion in Pakistan is strongly supportive of such a policy.
A second element hypothesized by Goertz and Diehl, although not fully investigated, is that a change in leadership in one or both countries may produce a breakthrough in diplomacy that produces a peace agreement. Specific, new policies, which involve the end of hostility with an enemy, need to be formulated and implemented in order for conflict resolution to occur. Major policy changes require new ideas, and these usually come in the form of new people. New leadership is frequently divorced from past policies, often comes into power because past policies have failed, and is not inhibited by the sunk costs of old leadership. US President Nixon's trip to China is often cited as an example of how a leader can have a significant impact on rivalry termination. Similarly, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's dramatic peace initiative toward Israel is another common example. Yet although the subsequent Camp David Accords significantly ameliorated the Israel-Egypt rivalry (less frequent and much less severe disputes), that rivalry did not end immediately, but persists today. Perhaps a better example is the transition away from an apartheid government in South Africa to one led by Nelson Mandela and his African National Congress party. This was quickly followed by the end of rivalries between South Africa and several of her neighbors.
As with some other political shocks, leadership changes that lead to a reorientation of foreign policy are often unexpected. At the moment, although foreign policy differences exist between the BJP and Congress parties in India, neither supports significant concessions on Kashmir. Similarly, no major political figure in Pakistan has supported abandoning or significantly revising Pakistani positions on that disputed territory. At least in the short term, any leader in either country doing otherwise will likely achieve little political benefit and does so at some personal risk.
Lebow has attempted to use the Cold War case to develop a set of conditions he believes accounts for the thawing of US-Soviet relations under Gorbachev and the winding down of rivalries in general. For accommodation to occur, he argues that the presence of the following three conditions for one of the rivals is critical: (1) a leader committed to domestic reforms, where foreign cooperation is necessary for those reforms, (2) that rivalry and confrontation has failed in the past to achieve a rival's goals and will likely to fail in the future, and (3) the belief that conciliatory gestures will be reciprocated. Thus, Lebow sees the end of rivalries beginning from domestic political considerations. Might these conditions arise in the India-Pakistan rivalry? This is very difficult to say, and indeed Lebow's conditions are more evident in retrospect. It is clear that Pakistan's attempts at securing Kashmir have failed, but the policy still remains popular on the domestic front. The emergence of a conciliatory leader who wants to resolve the conflict, as opposed to one that merely want to prevent escalation, is largely dismissed above. That leaves the third condition as largely speculative and therefore uncertain.
Overall, we do not paint an optimistic picture for the end of the India-Pakistan rivalry anytime soon. The competition is deeply engrained in each society, both in the public psyche and in military and government planning. A political shock alone, even if one were to occur, is insufficient to lead to the end of the rivalry. The other conditions associated with enduring rivalry termination are not present and probably unlikely for foreseeable future.
see Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, War and Peace in International Rivalry ( Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press , 2000).
William R. Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 45, no.4 (1995), 557-587.
see Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “(Enduring) Rivalries” in Manus Midlarsky ed., Handbook of War Studies , 2nd edition (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 222-267
A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980)
James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no.3 (1995), 379-414 .
Diehl and Goertz, War and Peace .
e.g., Paul R. Hensel, “An Evolutionary Approach to the Study of Interstate Rivalry,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 17, no.2 (1999); Zeev Maoz and Ben D. Mor, Bound by Struggle: The Strategic Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002).
Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Maoz, “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 28 (1984), 587.
These data, and indeed data on all militarized disputes in the international system, are available at http://cow2.la.psu.edu/
Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security 24 no.2 (1999), 5-55
Erik Gartzke and Michael Simon, “Hot Hand: A Critical Analysis of Enduring Rivalries,” Journal of Politics 63 (1999), 777-98.
Paul R. Hensel, “One Thing Leads to Another: Recurrent Militarized Disputes in Latin America, 1816-1986,” Journal of Peace Research 31 (1994), 281-98; Paul R. Hensel, “Hot Hands and Cold Wars: A Reassessment of the Stochastic Model of Rivalry.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, (September) 2001; Mark Crescenzi and Andrew Enterline, “Time Remembered: A Dynamic Model of Interstate Interaction,” International Studies Quarterly 45 (2001), 409-32; Michael Colaresi and William Thompson, “Hot Spots or Hot Hands?: Serial Crisis Behavior, Escalating Risks, and Rivalry,” Journal of Politics 64 (2002), 1175-198.
Diehl and Goertz, War and Peace ; see also Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, “The Political Uncertainty of Interstate Rivalries: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model,” in Paul F. Diehl ed., The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 64-97.
Hensel, “An Evolutionary Approach”; Maoz and Mor, Bound by Struggle.
Diehl and Goertz, War and Peace.
Edward Azar, “Conflict Escalation and Conflict Reduction in an International Crisis: Suez 1956,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 16 (1972), 183-201.
Hensel, “An Evolutionary Approach.”
Michael D. McGinnis and John T. Williams, Compound Dilemmas: Democracy, Collective Action and Superpower Rivalry (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001).
Russell Leng, Bargaining and Learning in Recurrent Crises: The Soviet-American, Egyptian-Israeli, and Indo-Pakistani Rivalries (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).
Hensel, “An Evolutionary Approach.”
Diehl and Goertz, War and Peace ; see also Michael P. Colarest, “Shocks to the System: Great Power Rivalry and the Leadership Long Cycle,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no.5 (2001), 569-574.
Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, “Regime Types and International Conflict, 1817-1976,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 33 (1989), 3-35.
Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).
Douglas M. Stinnett and Paul F. Diehl, “The Path(s) to Rivalry: Behavioral and Structural Explanations of Rivalry Development,” The Journal of Politics 63, no.3 (2001), 717-740.
Ganguly, The Origins of War.
Jaroslav Tir and Paul F. Diehl, “Geographic Dimensions of Enduring Rivalries,” Political Geography 21 (2002), 263-286.
Paul K. Huth, “Territory: Why Are Territorial Disputes Between States a Central Cause of International Conflict?” in John A. Vasquez (ed.), What Do We Know About War? (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 85-110; John A. Vasquez and Marie T. Henehan, “Territorial Disputes and the Probability of War, 1816-1992,” Journal of Peace Research 38, no.2 (2001), 123-138.
Paul Senese and John A. Vasquez, “A Unified Explanation of Territorial Conflict: Testing the Impact of Sampling Bias, 1919-1992,” International Studies Quarterly 47, no.2 (2003), 275-298.
Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 67.
William R. Thompson, “Principal Rivalries,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, no.2 (1995), 195-224; John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
Diehl and Goertz, War and Peace.
T. V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation By Weaker Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
Joseph Grieco, “Repetitive Military Challenges and Recurrent International Conflict, 1918-1994,” International Studies Quarterly 45 (2001), 295-316.
Maoz and Mor, Bound by Struggle.
Capabilities are measured according to yearly military expenditures and the number of military personnel in the each state. A broader measure of capabilities includes two additional indicators each on demographic (total population and urban population) and economic (steel production and energy consumption) dimensions. See J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965," in Bruce Russett ed., Peace, War, and Numbers (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), 19-48. Data are taken from http://cow2.la.psu.edu/
Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
Although nuclear tests did not occur until 1998, both states may have had some nuclear capability as early as 1990 and this was reflected in each state's policy making toward the other. I thank Stephen Cohen for this point.
Outcomes are taken directly from the COW militarized data set referenced earlier.
For a more detailed analysis of the strategic interaction between India and Pakistan, see Russell Leng, Bargaining and Learning in Recurrent Crises . (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).
McGinnis and Williams, Compound Dilemmas.
Diehl and Goertz, War and Peace .
The severity measure is based on COW “level of hostility” scores (reflecting the threat, display, and uses of military force) for both rivals in the dispute and the number of fatalities for both sides. Scores of less than 100 are those disputes without fatalities, and scores greater than 100 are those with fatalities including those that escalated to full-scale war. See Diehl and Goertz, War and Peace.
War is defined as a military confrontation resulting in 1,000 or more battle-related fatalities. See Meredith R. Sarkees, “The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to 1997,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 18, no.1 (2000), 123-144.
Paul F. Diehl and Mark Crescenzi, “Reconfiguring the Arms Race-War Debate,” Journal of Peace Research , 35, no. 1 (1998), 111-118.
Military spending data are taken from the Correlates of War Project at http://cow2.la.psu.edu/
Ganguly, Conflict Unending.
Ganguly, Conflict Unending.
Anand K. Verma, Reassessing Pakistan: Role of Two-Nation Theory (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2001), 152
John A. Vasquez, “Distinguishing Rivals that Go to War from Those That Do Not: A Quantitative Comparative Case Study of the Two Paths to War,” International Studies Quarterly 40 (1996), 531-558.
Sumit Ganguly and Kanti Bajpai, “India and the Crisis in Kashmir,” Asian Survey 43 no.5 (1994), 401-416.
Diehl and Goertz, War and Peace.
Diehl and Goertz, War and Peace ; Jacob Bercovitch and Paul F. Diehl, “Conflict Management of Enduring Rivalries: Frequency, Timing, and Short-Term Impact of Mediation,” International Interactions 22 (1997), 299-320.
J. Michael Greig, “Moments of Opportunity: Recognizing Conditions of Ripeness for International Mediation.” Journal of Conflict Resolution , 45, no 6 (2001), 691-718,
see, for example, Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: Norton Books, 2000).
Paul R. Hensel, Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “The Democratic Peace and Rivalries,” Journal of Politics 62, no.4 (2000), 1173-1188.
Hensel, Goertz and Diehl, “The Democratic Peace and Rivalries.”
Zeev Maoz, “The Debate Over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?” International Security 32 (1997), 162-198.
In order to qualify as a democracy, a state must have a score of 7 or greater on the POLITY regime type scale (10 is the maximum democracy score), which considers several democracy dimensions. Data are take from the most recent POLITY IV collection and available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/
We lag the democracy score one year to be sure that the state is really a democracy at the beginning of a year in which a dispute might or has occurred rather than at the end of the year, the reporting method of POLITY.
Devin T. Hagerty, “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis,” International Security 20 no.3 1995,: 11.
e.g., Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
David P. Forsythe, “Democracy, War, and Covert Action.” Journal of Peace Research , 29, no. 4 (1992), 385-395.
D. Scott Bennett, “Security, Bargaining, and the End of Interstate Rivalry,” International Studies Quarterly 40 (1996), 157-183; D. Scott Bennett, “Integrating and Testing Models of Rivalry Duration,” American Journal of Political Science 42 (1998), 1200-1232.
Diehl and Goertz, War and Peace.
Diehl and Goertz, War and Peace.
Richard Ned Lebow, “The Search for Accommodation: Gorbachev in Comparative Perspective,” in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds.), International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 167-186.
